EIGHTEEN years after the fall of Marcos, Congress is not becoming a more representative institution. In fact, today's legislators are richer now than ever before. While poverty levels since 1986 have remained at roughly between 30 and 40 percent of the population, lawmakers have become wealthier.

They are also older and better educated. As the results of a two-year PCIJ study of legislatures since 1898 show, members of the post-Marcos Congress tend to stay in office longer than their predecessors.

Moreover, most lawmakers come from political families, meaning that they have relatives who are currently holding or once held elective posts. In the House of Representatives, two of every three are members of political clans. The vast majority of these are second- and third-generation politicians with parents and grandparents who had been elected to public office.

In less than two months, Filipinos will be voting for a new set of legislators. Senatorial candidates have been campaigning since February. This week, they will be joined by those vying for seats in the House. If the results of previous elections are a guide, then the likelihood is that most of the legislators who will assume their seats in July would be so unlike the people who voted them to power.

The typical representative or senator cannot be more unlike the typical Filipino. The legislator is likely to be male, middle aged, and college educated, most likely with a degree in law. He has previously held a local government post and there is one chance in two that he is related to a former member of Congress.

He is also into business and has multiple income sources. He has property for rent, earns salary from a profession, and has investments in company shares. He is well off, with a net worth (most likely understated in his statement of assets) in millions of pesos. And the likelihood is that the longer he stays in Congress, the richer he becomes.

In 1962, only 27 percent of representatives were classified as upper class. In 1992, it was 44 percent. Over time, the assets of legislators have grown. In 1992, the average net worth of congressmen was P8 million. By 2001, it was P22 million. In the Senate, the average net worth increased from P33 million in 1998 to P59 million in 2001. A quarter of all senators today have a net worth of above P100 million.

The typical Filipino, meanwhile, is likely to be below 35, with a few years of high-school education, and an annual income of about P150,000 in 2000. The demographic profiles couldn't be more unmatched.

Legislators are Getting Richer

TERM	AVERAGE NET WORTH (P) OF REPRESENTATIVES	AVERAGE NET WORTH (P) OF SENATORS
9th Congress (1992-95)	8,401,072.28	-
11th Congress (1998-2001)	20,589,862.25	32,908,657.45
12th Congress (2001-2004)	21,914,669.72	59,358.557.06

Five congresses — the Eighth to the 12th — have been constituted since the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. The legislators elected to these bodies have hardly been representative of those they represent. In that sense, they have not been different from the past, when members of Congress were drawn from a narrow elite in terms of property, education (since 1898, they have been trained mainly in law) and social standing.

There have been changes, though. There are now many more women in Congress than there have been in the past. In the current House, there are 40 women, about 18 percent of the body, compared to only one percent in 1946, six percent in 1965, and 11 percent in 1992.

Today's legislators are also better educated than their predecessors, with 27 percent of all representatives boasting of postgraduate degrees, compared to only 18 percent in 1965.

The sources of their wealth are more diverse, indicating that many more business interests are represented in Congress, which can no longer be described as "landlord-dominated" legislature. The caciques of old have been replaced by real-estate developers, bankers, stockbrokers, and assorted professionals and businesspeople.

The changes reflect the changes in the Philippine economy, with the decline of agriculture and extractive industries (logging, mining) and the increasing importance of manufacturing, trade, and services. The changes have been obvious since the 1960s, when new men from business and the professions were elected to the legislature.

The rise of these new legislators mirrored the increasing political assertiveness of new sections of the business elite and the upper professional class that emerged in the 1950s and 60s. That period saw the birth of a manufacturing sector that produced previously imported goods for the local market. While many of those who became part of the manufacturing capitalists were large landowners, there were also those from the professional middle class and local traders who joined the ranks of the new rich and then sought seats in Congress.

Philippine legislatures have been hospitable to the entry of the newly affluent. Their ranks have been open to the constant infusion of new blood. The post-Marcos Congress is even more diverse in composition than its predecessors. It includes, aside from the old landowning families that have been in legislatures for 100 years, also new entrepreneurs, especially those in construction, real estate, and services that emerged among the fastest-growing economic sectors in the late 1980s and 1990s; middle-class professionals, especially lawyers from leading law firms; and leaders of nongovernmental organizations.

The legislature also has local officials or government bureaucrats able to build a base in their districts even if they are not backed by old wealth. In addition, the halls of Congress have recently accommodated celebrities from the movies, the mass media, and sports.

The legislature has traditionally opened to its members a world of privilege that enables the enterprising among them to take advantage of moneymaking opportunities and to accumulate wealth. A Congress seat can be used as a passport to the land of dealmaking, allowing aspiring politicians entry to the bastions of great wealth and privilege. In this sense, the legislature can be said to be an agent of mobility, allowing talented aspirants from the lower and middle classes entry to the narrow corridors of power and the most exclusive enclaves of the very rich.

Such mobility, however, is still limited to a narrow range of Philippine society. For sure, the more occupationally diverse membership from the more modern sectors of business, the mass media, and civil society means a wider range of perspectives and interests than at any time in the past. The trend toward increasing diversification that was noted in the 1960s continues today.

Moreover, the entry of party-list representatives in the 11th and 12th Congress enlarged that range, as it gave representatives of marginalized social sectors seats in the legislature. Despite this, however, Congress remains a fortress of privilege, its gates open to the new and aspiring rich, but closed — except for some narrow openings — to the poor and powerless.

The route to Congress, for the most part, is still via local government posts. Although recently, some have taken a shortcut, either through the media or the movies, or inherited their posts directly from a relative facing the three-term limit, the usual route is still for prospective legislators, even those who come from political families, to vie for "lesser" elective posts.

This trend was evident from the start. Political office in the Philippines has always been hierarchical: Aspiring politicians went up the political ladder from local to national office, from the House to the Senate, and from the Senate to the presidency. The upheavals caused by martial law disrupted this flow. The formula no longer works for those aspiring for the Senate and the presidency. But the path from local office to the House remains well trodden, although it has been fast-tracked for many because of the three-term limit.

In the 12th House that assumed office in 2001, 138 representatives — 61 percent — had been in public office prior to their first election to a post-Marcos House. Fewer representatives now come from the executive branch. Most of them — 49 percent of all representatives or 81 percent of those who had held public posts — had been elected to local office.

This shows the importance of a local political base in winning a House seat. Political families have the edge, because they can mobilize local patronage and political networks for their electoral forays. The same is not true of the Senate, however, because name recognition is more important in that chamber, allowing celebrities from the media and the movies to win hands down in national races even if they don't have a base in their districts. There are fewer celebrities in the House, although that is changing.

The passing on of a legislative seat from one generation to another provides evidence of the caste-like structure of the legislative elite. Four in every ten representatives in all the post-Marcos Congresses had relatives in previous legislatures. A third had parents who were in public office.

These are unusually high percentages and are an important index of the extent of real "democratization" that has taken place. But they still show, though, that Congress is not closed to those who do not come from powerful families. The flipside of the equation — six in every 10 representatives are not related to former legislators and seven out of 10 do not have parents who were in public office — should not be overlooked.

Once in Congress, however, legislators tend to stay there. The pattern since 1946 is for the number of first-termers in the House to decrease as time goes by, as congressmen hang on to their seats, using the perks and the powers available to their office to perpetuate themselves in power. Conversely, the number of those with multiple terms increases with time.

The trend is evident in the post-Marcos House as well, where the turnover rates would have been faster, as shown in the steep decline in the number of first-termers from the Eighth to the 10th House. By the 10th Congress, only 17 percent of representatives were on their first term, compared to 72 percent in the Eighth House.

This rapid decline was stemmed by the constitutional prohibition on more than three consecutive terms. The impact of the ban is evident in the sudden rise to 60 percent of the number of first-termers in the 11th House, only to decline again when a new House came to power in 2001.

Taken altogether, however, the turnover rate in the post-Marcos Congress is slower than that in pre-martial law years, despite term limits. From 1946 to 1961, an average of 51 percent of all members of Congress were new. The average for all the five post-Edsa congresses is only 46 percent. It would seem that there is less mobility in the post-Edsa legislature.

Political Families Rule Congress

HOUSE	NUMBER	%	% WITHOUT PARTY LIST*
8th (1987-1992)	122	62%	62%
9th (1992-1995)	128	64%	64%
11th Congress (1998-2001)	136	62%	65%
12th Congress (2001-2004)	140	61%	65%

*Party-list representatives were elected only since the 11th Congress.

Looking at the history of the Philippine legislatures from the 1898 Malolos Congress, it would seem that families, not parties, are their most enduring feature. Regimes come and go but the families remain. Political parties are formed and disbanded but the clans that make them up stay on.

Families survive wars, dictatorships, and uprisings. The most enduring political families are the best evidence of this: The Aquinos and Cojuangcos of Tarlac, the Osmeñas of Cebu, the Romualdezes of Leyte, and the Marcoses of Ilocos Norte, among others, have been in Philippine legislatures for four generations. Some families eventually go into decline after successive electoral defeats or the death of a powerful patriarch, but others, stronger and more resilient, hang on and flourish.

Data gathered for the PCIJ study show the persistence of political families since the fall of Marcos. The reality is still that politicians are elected largely by mobilizing their kinship networks and family assets (e.g. money, name recall, connections). Once in office, they pave the way for other relatives to be either appointed to the bureaucracy or elected to government posts. Within a few years, a newly elected legislator will likely have kin in local office, various government agencies, and state-owned corporations. Before long, the next generation takes over.

Two-thirds of the legislators in the post-Marcos Congress are members of political families. Of these, 70 percent are second and third-generation politicians. Nearly all of them also have multiple relatives in public office.

In the Eighth Congress, the first post-Marcos legislature, 61 percent or 122 of 198 representatives were from political clans. The proportion has remained pretty much the same since then, despite the entry of party-list representatives in the 11th and 12th House. In the 12th Congress, which was elected in 2001, 61 percent or 140 of 228 representatives came from political clans. In the 11th House, it was 62 percent. If the percentages are computed without the party-list representatives, however, the numbers increase to 65 percent for the 11th House and 66 percent for the 12th.

The figures indicate that term limits set by the 1987 Constitution, which banned representatives from seeking more than three consecutive terms, did not make a dent on clan power. Representatives who were elected in the Eighth House, for example, could sit only up to the 10th Congress. And yet, the number of political family members in the 11th House is not much different from the ones before it. In many cases, the clans simply fielded other family members to replace those who faced term limits. In other cases, rival clans merely took the place of the incumbent ones.

The findings of the PCIJ's study of Congress are published in the book, The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress.

http://www.pcij.org/stories/2004/congress.html

Copyright © 2004 All rights reserved.
PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM

Transformation: Philippines

A. Executive summary

This report delineates the Phillipines’ incremental development of a market-based democracy. It highlights the transition experienced by the country in its restoration of democratic political institutions and in the reformation of an underdeveloped and under-performing market economy. Despite its guarantee of a wide degree of freedom and political participation, the Philippines is still struggling to find solutions to its economic, social, and political problems.

The Philippines boasts a rich democratic tradition.. However, social and economic inequalities have contributed to the rise of an elitist democracy. More often than not, power brokers tend to have the upper hand in manipulating political as well as economic resources to their advantage. Patronage politics dominates the political system. This, in turn, hinders efficient management of political and economic resources.

The Philippines still lags behind its regional counterparts in ensuring a decent standard of living for its people. No dramatic changes have taken place  since the Arroyo administration assumed power in 2001. Poverty and unemployment are  still high and  magnified by inflationary pressures that place particular pressure on those who work in the agricultural sector. There is a consistent move to further privatization and liberalization policies, which aim at increasing the welfare of more citizens.. There has also been consistency in the lowering of tariffs to guarantee the country’s access to international and regional markets. The country has been successful in adhering to the principles of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in which it is a member.

This report also provides an overview of the ability of the government to pursue policies of a more liberalized and competitive democracy. The political leadership is constrained by the current political constellation in government and has adopted inadequate measures to address social and economic problems.  Despite these shortcomings, the Philippines is on its way toward a more liberal and market-based democracy. The level of transformation will be modest, not dramatic.


B. History and characteristic of the transformation

The historic peaceful uprising in 1986, which led to the restoration of a democratic government after fourteen years of Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorial regime, served as a template for similar transformations in 36 other countries in Asia and around the world. However, it failed to maximize the process of democratic transformation to bolster economic change. Despite its sterling democratic credentials, the Philippines continue to lag behind in terms of social and economic development compared to its neighbors in the South East Asian region.

Nonetheless, it managed to maintain its commitment to the democratic consensus amid the punctuated challenges of insurgency, secessionism, terrorism, and military adventurism. The post-Marcos democratic transition saw intermittent periods of political and economic stability amid domestic and regional instability. President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) presided over the initial phase of the post-1986 democratic transition, which  was devoted to the dismantling of the centralized authoritarian power structure and restoration of pre-martial law democratic institutions.

The most important aspect of the political reform was the restoration of the presidential system of government based on the principles of separation of powers and checks and balance among the three branches of government: the executive, legislative and the judiciary. Democratic transformation in the post-1986 period was further characterized by 1) the free election of legislators and local officials; 2) the strengthening of the legislature; 3) the reestablishment of an independent and credible judiciary; 4) restoration of a free press; and 5) institutionalization of a decentralized bureaucracy and local government autonomy. These were implemented as constitutional safeguards to prevent the resurgence of authoritarian dictatorship in the country.

President Aquino survived a series of military coup attempts,  managed the drafting of a new constitution and oversaw the peaceful and democratic transition of presidential powers to her successor, Fidel Ramos (1992-1998). President Ramos placed into motion an ambitious peace initiative, which sought to resolve internal armed conflicts with various political armed groups such as the communists, military pustchists and Muslim secessionists. He recognized  the need for political stability in order to further  economic development.

President Ramos also concentrated his efforts on transformation towards a market economy by utilizing programs of liberalization and privatization with the aim of greater competitiveness in the international market. His peace and development program provided a  period of economic growth and political stability. Nonetheless, the 1997 Asian financial crisis  decimated much of the economic gains of the Ramos administration.

The election of popular movie actor Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) to the presidency followed the economic turmoil of the Asian financial crisis. Estrada brought new challenges to Philippine democracy. Despite having been elected with the widest electoral margin in the post-1986 period, Estrada was plagued by allegations of abuse of power, a lavish lifestyle and corruption. This led to his impeachment and subsequent ouster in a second people power uprising in 2001. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was then installed as president (2001-present). Arroyo’s first term in office was punctuated by  serious challenges to the legitimacy of her government.

The failed attempt of disgruntled Estrada supporters, largely drawn from the poverty-stricken masses, to mount their own people power uprising against President Arroyo in 2001 marked the reemergence of a potential legitimacy  crisis that reflected the deep political and socio-economic divisions in the country. This was exacerbated by a mutiny led by junior military officers in late 2003.

Arroyo stood for re-election in the 2004 presidential election despite claiming numerous times she would not. The election was not only a referendum on the performance of the Arroyo administration, but was also an institutional mechanism for mitigating the potential crisis of legitimacy  in the Philippines. However, flawed electoral administration, wanton use of government resources for partisan political purposes and allegations of fraud and massive cheating  slightly diminished the election  as a credible legitimating mechanism. Armed with a fresh, albeit disputed mandate, President Arroyo is poised to address the burgeoning fiscal crisis and other economic problems that have prevented the Philippines from attaining full transition to  a market-based democracy.

 
C. Assessment

1. Democracy

1.1. Stateness

The Philippine Constitution, which was overwhelmingly ratified by almost 76% of the electorate in 1987, clearly defines citizenship and equally accords its rights and privileges to include the cultural minorities in the autonomous regions of Cordillera and Mindanao. The majority (84%) of Filipinos closely identify with the nation-state as reflected in a 2003 Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey. Possessing Filipino citizenship is among the important requisites for national identity, according to 96% of respondents; and 85% would rather be a citizen of the Philippines than of any other country in the world.

The 1987 constitution also outlines the institutional scope and functions of the state. The Philippine state is adequately established with differentiated power structures spread throughout the archipelago. The scope of the state is extensive as manifested by its presence in 17 regions, 79 provinces, 117 cities, 1,500 municipalities and 41,975 barangays (villages). More than 1,445 million civil servants are employed in national government agencies, government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units responsible for running the state machinery.

A total of 119,577 police and 106,000 military personnel are responsible for the country’s internal and external security. However, even though the scope of the Philippine state is clearly established, its strength and capacity to perform its functions is often held in doubt. The communist-led New People’s Army, secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), terrorist Abu Sayyaf, and private armies employed by local warlords and political clans, continue to challenge the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force in remote areas of the country.

While the principle of the separation of church and state is guaranteed in the 1987 constitution, the major religious groups and denominations exert considerable influence on political issues and policy. The dominant Roman Catholic Church’s long-standing critique of the state’s family planning policy has aggravated the rapid, massive and unsustainable population growth that is projected to double to 160 million by 2030. Other religious organizations, such as the homegrown Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), the charismatic Catholic El Shaddai, and the evangelical Jesus is Lord, exercise great influence on the selection of candidates to be supported by their members. The ability to generate religious command votes gives them the latent power to influence policy formulation and implementation.


1.2. Political participation

Generally, there are no restraints on the conduct of free and fair elections in the Philippines. The country has extensive experience with electoral democracy since the Americans introduced it in the 1900s. Election and party politics experienced a temporary hiatus during the authoritarian regime. The democratic transition since 1986 has witnessed twenty-two national and local elections.

The Philippine state has been characterized as being "captured" in competing and diverse social interests such as dominant socioeconomic classes, political clans, powerful families and other entrenched particularistic groups. It is caught between the predatory rent-seeking behavior of landed interests, monopolists and cartelists and the over vigilant and highly empowered members of civil society and mass media. Freedoms of association, of assembly, of opinion and of the press are sacrosanct and unrestricted. Thus, the dynamic between the Philippine state, civil society and mass media is a tapestry of struggles for domination and transformation at all levels.


1.3. Rule of law

The reintroduction of the bicameral legislature and the restoration of the pre-martial law Senate were constitutional mechanisms to balance the powers of the president and prevent the resurgence of authoritarianism. The Supreme Court oversees the administration of justice in the four-tiered Integrated Court System, collectively known as the judiciary. Serious issues and problems such as allegations of graft, corruption, incompetence and bias against the poor have encumbered the Philippine judicial system. Cognizant of the problem of inefficiency in the administration of justice, the Supreme Court has adopted the Action Program for Judicial Reform (2001-2006) to introduce the much-needed changes concerning institutional development, human resources development and reform support systems. Nonetheless, a negative perception of the judiciary remains, as reflected in the 2003/04 SWS survey that indicated 49% of lawyer respondents have knowledge of a case in their province or city where a judge took a bribe.

Corruption and criminality are among the major obstacles to the institutionalization of the rule of law in the Philippines. According to World Bank estimates, at least 20% of the annual budget is lost to corruption. This figure is equivalent to 3.8% of the country’s Gross National Product. From 1995 to 2000, the total amount lost to corruption is estimated at 609 billion pesos. The Philippines has not improved its score in the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) survey of the Transparency International (TI). The country ranked at the bottom 65th of 91 least corrupt countries in 2001; 77th of 102 in 2002; 92nd of 133 in 2003; and 102nd of 145 in 2004. Its average CPI for the past four years is a dismal 2.6. Through the years, several mechanisms have been designed to combat corruption in the Philippines. These include setting the legal framework and establishing anti-graft and corruption bodies like presidential committees, commissions, task forces and other units. Most of these bodies have performed miserably, so that corrupt officeholders are not prosecuted adequately under the law, but occasionally attract adverse publicity. Among the factors for the prevalence of corruption in the country is the low risk of detection of corrupt offenses and the low probability of punishment for such offenses.

Criminality remains a major problem in the country. In 2003, the Chinese-Filipino community reported that at least one victim was being kidnapped every three days. The U.S. State Department’s “International Narcotic Control Strategy Report” released in 2004, said that the Philippines have become a major producer of crystal methamphetamine hydrochloride.

On a positive note, there are no blatant restrictions on civil rights in the Philippines in recent years. Although the Marcos family and their associates who were responsible for massive human rights abuses during their reign still manage to elude conviction. Civil society organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) have remained vigilant in the defense of human rights in the country. A minimal number of human rights violations resulting from military operations against the communist insurgency, Muslim secessionists and terrorist organizations; and incidence of extrajudicial killings in some local campaigns against criminality were reported by the AI in 2003. An extensive range of institutional and procedural safeguards, complaints mechanisms and legal sanctions have been institutionalized and guaranteed by the Commission on Human Rights - a constitutional body mandated to promote the protection, respect for and enhancement of human rights.

1.4. Stability of democratic institutions

Political institutions in the Philippines fundamentally perform their functions, although policy-making and implementation is shaped largely by political considerations between the executive and legislative branches of government. The president has to rely on coalition building to permanently secure majorities in both chambers and push a legislative agenda through. Given the “clientele-ist” nature of the party system, the president is also dependent on local elites for electoral mobilization. Through congress, the bastion of local power in the national government, local elites bargain with the president for access to state resources in exchange for legislative and electoral support.
There has been an absolute “democratic consensus” since 1986. Respect for the country’s political institutions and laws are considered among the most important requisites for national identity, according to 90% of respondents in a 2003 SWS survey. However, there are counter-state organizations and other potential veto players that continue to threaten this consensus. They include the communist insurgents, Muslim secessionists, criminal and terrorist organizations, and military adventurists.

1.5. Political and social Integration

The 1987 constitution mandates the shift from a two-party system to a multiparty system under a presidential form of government. The country’s multiparty system is gradually stabilizing around four major political parties, namely: Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas CMD), Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Liberal Party (LP) and the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). All of the governing and opposition coalitions that have emerged since the 1992 synchronized national and local elections were formed around these political parties. In the 2004 synchronized elections, the ruling Lakas CMD, LP and a handful of minor parties formed the victorious Koalisyon ng Karanasan at Katapatan sa Kinabukasan (Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future, K4). On the other hand, the LDP together with some minor opposition parties formed the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (Coalition of United Pilipinos, KNP). The NPC split its ranks to support both the administration and opposition coalitions.

The seeming resilience of these four parties is largely derived from the moderate polarization and volatility of the electorate. Nonetheless, political parties in the Philippines are personality-based organizations that organize primarily around dominant local political clans and warlords. They are anchored on clientelistic, parochial and personal inducements rather than on issues, ideologies and party platforms. A survey conducted by the SWS in June 2004 reveals that 67% of respondents do not consider any political party as representing their welfare. The weak party linkage in society results in a regular split and merger of these parties into ad hoc coalitions. This is exacerbated by constant party switching. Politicians have virtually institutionalized the practice of party switching.

The 1987 constitution introduced a list proportional representation scheme of electing one-fifth of the members of the House of Representatives to open legislative recruitment and represent other sectors in society. The party list system continues to thrive despite low voter awareness and confused implementation in 1998 and 2001. While the voter base for the party list election more than doubled from 6.5 million in 2001 to just under 15 million in 2004, the 20% seat allocation has yet to be filled in the last three party list elections. Nevertheless, various interest groups and civil society organizations have taken advantage of this narrow pathway into the bastion of elitist politics.

There are a myriad of interest groups in the Philippines. However, only a handful of those representing dominant economic interests enjoy access and influence in the formal political system. Major organizations representing the interests of labor and farmers are divided along conservative, moderate and radical advocacies. The pent-up democratic impulses of the anti-dictatorial struggle evolved into a vibrant civil society. There is a strong citizens’ consent for democratic norm and practices. A 2004 SWS survey indicated that though only 40% of respondents were satisfied with how democracy works, 57% still preferred it to authoritarianism.

Numerous voluntary associations and civic self-organizations have blossomed in the period of democratic transition and are actively involved in development work and issue advocacy. Trust and social capital among the population are cultivated and harnessed by these robust, albeit heterogeneous, civil society organizations. Conversely, some civil society organizations have been co-opted by personal, political and economic interests - the dark side of social capital.

http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/122.0.html

Reflections on Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia:
Why do the Philippines and Singapore differ?

By Rachel Caoili(1)

The following discussion is motivated by an interest in the disparities of democracy and development in Asia. Personal experience and academic research in the circumstances of the Philippines and Singapore have highlighted the critical influence of political culture in the success of a nation. One need only consider how the Philippines has been an American platform of democracy in Asia, yet it remains a developing country with entrenched inequalities and poverty. On the other hand, Singapore – with its own home-grown communitarian culture - advocates certain values opposed to Western liberal democracy and has become one of the world’s most advanced industrial countries in less than half a century. It appears that a particular political culture supporting success in Singapore contrasts with Western liberal values still promising socio-economic progress in the Philippines.

I Democracy and Development

Democracy tends to be measured by citizenship participation, electoral competition and civil liberties. Yet existing representative democracies in Asia are not functioning as intended as the developing world still struggles to achieve socio-political stability and sustainable economic growth. In explaining the relationship between democracy and development, Herbert Werlin highlights two important questions:

the question of priority: Is economic development essential for democracy or vice versa?; and

the question of definition: Is liberal democracy the only acceptable form of democracy? (2)

Research reveals that "while economic development often precipitates democracy, democracy does not automatically lead to economic development."(3) It is emphasised that economic development is necessary, though not sufficient, for democratisation.(4) Regardless, the more prosperous a nation is, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.(5)

In the symbiotic relationship between democracy and development, democracies accompanied by liberalised markets provide the engine for growth. This is because decentralisation of political power and market liberalisation contribute to producer confidence, initiative, investment, and growth.(6) Ultimately, however, it is domestic stability that attracts capital and stimulates growth. Nations that have been able to create political stability have been able to grow much faster than those that could not, regardless of the type of political regime.(7) Democracy and economic growth are further linked through democracy's emphasis on the provision of literacy, education, and communication. Moreover, democracies resolve social conflict through non-violent political solutions; therefore, democratic regimes tend to be more politically resilient than authoritarian regimes where stability is often short-lived and violently managed.(8) Essentially, democracy indirectly affects economic growth through influencing a country’s political stability and corresponding investment appeal.

In order to understand the discourse on democracy and development, it is important to distinguish that classical democracy is arguably more essential than liberal democracy. The former is based on the Athenian concept of community, political education in civic virtue, and recognition of a shared fate; while the latter is based on the idea that the individual is the core consideration of humanity. The modern West’s fundamental tenet of individual self-fulfilment within a democratic framework contrasts with the ‘economic miracles’ and continuing resilience of East Asian countries, embedded as they often are in Confucian social ethics. The experience of democracy in Asia has allowed for political systems to feature patron-client Communitarianism, personalism, deference to authority, dominant political parties, and a strong interventionist state.(9) Nevertheless, Communitarian political culture alongside good governance has been and continues to be a crucial element in the successful economic progress of Singapore. Indeed, democracy is experienced differently across nations. As Samuel Huntington aptly emphasises: the prevalence of modernisation does not substantiate widespread acceptance of Westernisation.(10)

The Asian Experience

Asia’s modernisation experience provides a rich field for examples of the corruptive reputation of power, as elites have become the notorious practitioners of ‘crony capitalism’ and nepotism at the cost of national productivity. Prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, it was questionable whether countries in Southeast Asia that had adopted liberal economic standards would follow through with political reform.(11) The Asian crisis highlighted the need for accountable governance and transparent institutions. While liberal democratic reform has gradually become evident across contemporary Southeast Asia, Singapore displays the least change towards a liberal democratic political system, (12) and yet was rated by Transparency International in 2001 as the world’s least corrupt country.(13) Indeed, the globalisation phenomenon tends to reward countries with good economic governance and disadvantage those with poor economic governance: "The more expert governments were in directing the national economy toward developmental goals then the more likely there would be sustained economic growth and relative equality in distribution of resources." (14) Concurrently, good governance is defined by the Asian Development Bank as the manner in which power is exercised in managing a country's social and economic resources towards development.(15)

National development is much dependent upon the quality of a nation’s human capital. A country's policies toward education, opening the economy to foreign trade, land reform, and government intervention in the economic growth process tend to determine economic growth more than democracy.(16) The success of Singapore and other Newly Industrialised Economies of East Asia questions the view that democratisation is a political conditionality for foreign aid and economic success. Arguably, it is strong government leadership managing economic progress rather than democracy that is necessary for economic development. Thus, Singapore is an exceptional example demonstrating how communitarian ideology and strong leadership implement good governance, resulting in economic prosperity and political stability. In outstanding contrast, a country such as the Philippines, a consolidated liberal democracy with a vibrant civil society has no legacy of good governance and is still awaiting economic renaissance. While this contrast is developed in section II, below is a summary by way of introduction.

The Philippines

Christianity from the West rather than Confucianism from China shaped the Philippines in terms of social values. As the Philippines struggles toward greater economic and social progress, political inadequacies in the Philippines’ formal democracy are clearly evident. Since the 1946 independence from the United States, the Philippines persisted as an oligarchic democracy though civil society has grown strong.(17) Four centuries of colonialism have influenced political-administrative culture in the Philippines; thereby affecting political and economic developments under recent presidents. The Philippines’ democratic consolidation process has been difficult due to the state’s weak capacities, vibrant but contentious civil society, and slow growth economy that accentuated class, regional, and religious cleavages.(18) Political leaders have been committed to reform of the country’s political, economic and social condition, however, sustainable economic development has not yet been realised. This is exacerbated by domestic insurgency that thrives in the absence of regime legitimacy. Does the Philippines therefore suffer from an unruly political culture compared to Singapore’s more disciplined one? The case of Singapore will be examined in greater detail in section III, but below is a short explanation.

Singapore

Singapore’s government is well-known for its post-independence Communitarian ideology. ‘Communitarian capitalism’ is criticised because it is not founded on Western values of individualism, and hence there are differing attitudes toward human rights between American and East Asian political cultures. Nevertheless, Singapore displays vital signs of democratic life in the form of popular representation, political equality and majority rule except when it comes to giving opposition parties adequate political space. Singapore’s ‘dominant one-party system’ – via the People's Action Party (PAP) - has been termed ‘soft authoritarianism’,(19) ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘semi-democracy’, ‘controlled democracy’, ‘guided democracy’, and ‘Communitarian democracy’.(20) Government by the PAP has acquired a distinctive reputation as an ideologically self-conscious interventionist, but popularly elected government that controls freedoms in the civil society while producing a better material life for the population.(21)

How did this come to be? The PAP has charted a path towards good government based on the Confucian moral right to rule and advocacy of ‘shared values’, while maintaining its popular dominance due to performance legitimacy.(22) This is based on the Asian values debate that economic growth can occur without the individualism associated with Western pluralistic democracy. In conformity with a Confucian orientation, the rights of the individual in Singapore are considered subordinate to collective welfare. However, critics such as Chris Patten have argued that elements of Asian values are found in Western as well as Eastern culture; the ‘Tigerism’ of East Asia is not unique in its value system as Europe and North America today desire their own golden ages of old-fashioned discipline.(23) Patten even disputes the Confucian essence of Asian values, noting its convenient political utility in justifying the subservience of individual interests to those of the state; and yet Confucius passionately defended personal liberty through the family unit against state power.(24) Thus, claims about the Asian way are considered by some as purely self-serving rhetoric. However, there is no point in throwing out the proverbial baby with the bathwater: Confucian ethics have much to teach on how to harness harmony, partnership, responsibility and community consciousness toward greater economic and social progress. Moreover, whether one agrees with or disputes the Asian values argument, its existence in the rhetoric of a state’s political life suggests a political culture open to its deployment. In other words, that Asian values are capable of being invoked invests them with the power to colour a particular political culture. The contrast between two societies with strong Confucianism roots, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrates this. Both are proud of their democratic credentials but one, Singapore, has invoked Asian values; the other, Taiwan, rejects the relevance of Confucian or Asian values to democratisation. Thus, even in strongly Confucian societies, political culture can differ markedly. What, then, constitutes political culture?

What is Political Culture?

International relations involves more than power politics between states. States with interests and policies must be regarded at a deeper level; one needs to understand the culture that conditions policymakers and society into having such interests. Human beings, singly and collectively, are the source of all international politics.(25) Hence, studying culture is significant to understanding the similarities and differences in people’s experiences of political systems. Culture is understood as "any interpersonally shared system of meanings, perceptions, and values".(26) In this way, culture is a template for human action, ultimately explaining the driving force behind a nation’s identity and direction. Postmodernist studies suggest that all things "political" have their roots in broad systems of shared meaning.(27) Insofar as politics reflects the broader societal culture, political culture may be understood as "all of the discourse, values and implicit rules that express and shape political actions and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another and ultimately provide a logic of political action".(28)

Political culture studies sprung from the cultural anthropology research of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Harold Lasswell, and others who sought to understand how socialisation of children might relate to political identity. However, while such work influenced studies of ‘national character’ in the Second World War, they soon proved unconvincing in explaining the political behaviour of Germany, Japan, and the US.(29) By the 1980s and 1990s, political scientists retreated from reductionist tendencies and decided to research institutions, recognising the need to understand rational self-interest in comparative contexts of laws, rules, ideas, beliefs, and values, which explain the political identity of different countries. Thus, political culture studies are now more rigorously researched, including historical and descriptive analysis as well as important theoretical explanations allowing for a better understanding of economic growth and democratisation in different cultural contexts.(30)

The end of the Cold War highlighted the significance of cultural identity as seen in the hegemony of Western culture, capitalism, and liberal democratic order that was imposed on the culture of most societies.(31) Democracy is said to require a distinctive set of political values in its citizens: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, and participation.(32) However, a society’s orientation towards democracy depends on their distinct culture. In this way, political culture involves the knowledge, beliefs, feelings, and value judgements of a political system.(33) Notably, political culture is not a static phenomenon but dynamically conditioned by such factors as economic change, civil society, institutional practice, the international climate of ideas, and national security. Indeed, the last of these introduces political culture’s off-shoot in the form of strategic culture. Nations display a distinctive and strategically evolving style of digesting the problems of national security: "Strategic realities are therefore in part culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated".(34) Differences in values are reflected in how culture influences economic development, with some cultures possessing distinct advantage because of their values. For instance, Confucian values are used to justify East Asian governments who promote sacrifice for the sake of the nation and virtue in loyalty to the state. The spirit of Confucius becomes the spirit of nationalism in East Asia, as "Confucian family values became the propaganda link between economic prosperity and political obedience".(35)

Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was able to mould the society of Singapore into a ‘success story’ because he implemented policies that changed the society’s "software"(36) to obtain national security inclusive of economic progress. In doing so, Lee Kuan Yew thoroughly advocated Asian values in a Confucian context. He criticised the West’s exploitation of individualist tendencies and the erosion of individual responsibility, resulting in over-reliance on government to solve social problems.(37) Western culture understands the individual as an "autonomous entity, marked by its ability and right to choose freely between equal alternatives as well as its potential for unhindered self-fulfilment".(38) This is contrary to the Confucian concept of the individual who is not atomistic but rather defined through social institutions and relationships. Political participation in Confucian terms is based on the family metaphor and values such as loyalty, responsibility, duty, mutual trust, and reciprocity are necessary to keep harmony in the community. Confucianism, while hierarchical in social stratification, is no enemy of democracy. After all, it positions itself within traditional Chinese culture, and in this a major political concept is the Mandate of Heaven (Tianming) which is understood to reflect the will of the people.(39) How democracy is achieved is the key question in relation to Confucian culture.

The Pursuit of Democracy

"Democracy cannot mean all things to all people"; there are definitional limits for any realistic use of the term ‘democracy’.(40) In the most basic sense, democracy is a political system that has: (41)

meaningful extensive competitions between individuals and groups for effective government positions, at regular intervals, and without the use of force;

a highly inclusive level of political participation in selecting leaders and policies; and

a level of civil and political liberties to ensure integrity of political competition and participation – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations.

As noted earlier, an essential distinction between classical and liberal democracy is the difference in values; classical democracy is concerned with civic virtue while liberal democracy is concerned with individual freedom. Institutions of democracy may have a variety of forms and are differently valued according to cultural contexts. Countries that have formal institutions of democracy are not necessarily practising or fully experiencing the essence or rewards of democratic participation and are yet to become more substantial and consolidated democracies. A true democratic political condition is a constitutional or role-governed order where virtue exists in equal citizens actively participating in the arrangements through which they are governed.(42) A perfect democracy is impossible because democracy is a constant horizon that must continually be reached for – "democracy will always be unfinished business".(43) However much a strong democracy is commonly desired, it depends on greater equality and the notion of active citizenship and engagement.(44) This requires reformed social attitudes towards power, not just as a tool for political ends but also as a system of checks and balances through popular mandate.

Transitions to democracy do not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation.(45) Certain socio-political conditions are necessary for a democracy to endure and consolidate: democracy itself, affluence, growth with moderate inflation, declining inequality, a favourable international climate, and parliamentary institutions.(46) There is a normative idea that democracy is a universal good as seen in democracy’s current moral prestige and the extent to which it is employed (at least rhetorically) by nearly all regimes as an agent of political legitimation in contemporary international discourse.(47) Since the mid-1970s, there has been a significant growth in liberal democracies around the world with three quarters of today’s governments ruled by free or partly free democratic institutions.(48) Thus, promoting democracy is a prerequisite for many international bodies such as the World Bank that commends democracy as the preferred form of government in light of certain empirical realities:

no sustained famine has occurred in recent decades in an independent democratic country because democracy allows regular elections, opposition parties to voice criticism, and media to report freely thereby questioning government policies for the sake of public welfare;(49)

Democratic peace theory (50) suggests there are no wars between democracies because, ideologically, the democratic ethos promotes tolerance, moderation, and a basic inclination to seek peaceful conflict resolution; and structurally, it engages in power sharing and public accountability which makes it difficult for leaders to convince the public to go to war.(51)

In the past it has been debated whether democracy is beneficial for growth because it limits the ability of the bureaucracy to be proactive in economic policies. Regardless, "democracy appears to prevent the worst outcomes, even if it does not guarantee the best ones."(52) Indeed, as Richard Swift remarks, "[T]o build a strong democracy based on a ‘popular sovereignty’ that is more than a convenient fiction is the potential beginning of sanity, stability, and sustainability."(53)

When addressing the linkage between political culture and democracy, and ultimately development, it is important to note that socio-economic development is not entirely due to culture. There are non-cultural variables that affect it.(54) Nonetheless, some Asian values are found to be favourable to economic growth in developing countries, not discounting the positive necessities of democratic values in the West. Regardless of which value system is better, it is notable that culture as the sum of values in society defines the rights and duties for individuals as they interact, and therefore cultural values affect national behaviour, policy, and outcomes.(55)

Governance and the Developmental State

The concept of governance regards "the extent to which government is effective, honest, equitable, transparent and accountable".(56) The Asian financial crisis in 1997 highlighted how the Philippines, like many of its Asian counterparts, needed to improve governance practices.